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1    Introduction 
  
In 1996, Mambo et al [12] first introduced the concept of a proxy signature scheme, 
which allows the original signer to delegate his signature power to a designed signer, 
called the proxy signer. Then the proxy signer is able to sign on the behalf of the original 
signer. Several other multi proxy signature schemes [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [15] were 
proposed. In 2001, Hwang et al [2] first proposed the concept of multi-proxy multi-
signature scheme.  
In a multi-proxy multi-signature scheme, only the cooperation of all the signers in the 
authorized proxy group can generate the proxy signature on the behalf of the original 
signer group. 
     A new type of cryptographic primitive called  “signcryption” which combines a 
function of digital signature scheme with a symmetric key encryption algorithm was 
introduced by Zheng in [16]. Signcryption not only provides authenticity and 
confidentiality in a single step, but also gives more efficient computations than traditional 
signature-then-encryption. Steinfiel and Zheng [14] and Malone-Lee and Mao [11] 
proposed efficient signcryption schemes that are based on integer factorization and using 
RSA. 
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     An identity –based cryptosystem is a novel type of cryptographic scheme proposed by 
Shamir [13], which enables any pair of users to communicate securely, and to verify each 
other’s signatures without exchanging public or private keys, without keeping any key 
directories and without using the services of any third party. Problem with the traditional 
public key cryptosystems (PKCs) are the high cost of the infrastructure needed to manage 
and authenticate public keys, and the difficulty in managing multiple communities. In an 
ID-based PKC, everyone’s public keys are predetermined by information that uniquely 
identifies them, such as their email address. There is no need for any public key 
certificate. A trusted key generation center (KGC) generates the private keys of the 
entities in the group using their public key. First ID-based signcryption scheme was 
proposed by Malon-Lee [10] in 2002, Libert and Quisquater [8] proposed a provably 
secure identity-based signcryption schemes from pairing. Several other ID-based 
signcryption schemes were proposed. Li et al [7] have proposed a proxy signcryption. 
However, none of existing signcryption schemes is multi-proxy multi- signcryption 
scheme. In 2005, Liu Jun Bao and Xiao Guo-Zhen [9] proposed multi-proxy multi-
signcryption scheme from pairing.  
 
     In this paper we propose an ID-based multi-proxy multi-signcryption scheme from 
pairing. In this scheme, only the cooperation of all members in t he original signcrypter 
group could authorize a proxy group as his proxy agent. Then only the cooperation of all 
the signcrypters in the authorized proxy group can generate the proxy signcryption on the 
behalf of the original signcrypter group. As compared to the scheme in [9] the proposed 
scheme provides the public verifiability of the signature. Further the scheme is ID-based 
therefore; the key management problem is simplified. 
     The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some definitions and preliminary work 
are given in section 2, Liu and Xiao scheme is described in section 3, and proposed 
scheme is given in section 4. The security of the scheme is discussed in section 5. Finally, 
the conclusions are given in section 6. 
 
 
2    Preliminary Works 
 
In this section, we briefly describe the basic definition and properties of the bilinear 
pairing. 
2.1    Bilinear Pairings 
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P, whose order is a prime q, and G2 be 
a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q. Let a, b be elements of *qZ . A 
bilinear pairings is a map 211: GGGe ®´ with the following properties: 
1) Bilinearity: ( ) ( )abQPebQaPe ,, = . 
2) Non-degeneracy:  There exists P and Q such that ( ) 1, ¹QPe . 
3) Computability:   There is an efficient algorithm to compute ( )QPe ,  for all 1, GQP Î  
The security of our scheme described here relies on the hardness of the following prob-
lems: 
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DBDHP: Given two groups G1and G2 of the same prime order q, a bilinear map 
211: GGGe ®´ and a generator P of G1the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman 
problem (DBDHP) in (G1 , G2 , e) is to decide whether h = e(P,P)abc given (P,aP,bP,cP) 
and an element 2Gh Î . 
 
CBDHP: Given two groups G1and G2 of the same prime order q, a bilinear 
map 211: GGGe ®´  and a generator P ofG1, the Computational Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman problem (CBDHP) in (G1,G2,e) is to compute h = e(P,P)abc given 
(P,aP,bP,cP). 
No algorithm is known to be able to solve any of them so far, through DBDHP is no 
harder than CBDHP. 
 
3    Liu -Xiao Scheme 
                                                      
This scheme consists of four phases: 
 
System Initialization: Let  A1…….An be n original signcrypters. Each Ai chooses secret 
key *qai Zx Î and computes public key Pxy aiai = . 
Let P1, P2,…..Pl constitute the group of proxy signcrypters. Each proxy signcrypter 
chooses secret key *qpj Zx Î   and computes public key Pxy pjpj = . 
Let C be the unsigncrypter with secret key *qc Zx Î  and public Pxy cc = . 
        Let E and D be the encryption and decryption functions respectively and let 
{ } **1 1,0: qZH ® ,  { } 1*2 1,0: GH ®  and  { }
nGH 1,0: 23 ®  be the hash functions. 
System parameters are (G1, G2, e, P, q, H1, H2, H3, E, D). 
 
Proxy Key Generation: The original signcrypters make the signed warrant Wm and 
broadcast to the proxy signcrypters. Through the following protocol, each proxy 
signcrypter Pj gets a proxy key pjS . 
   
1.  Each of the original signcrypters computes )(2 waiai mHxS = and broadcasts it all  
        the proxy signcrypter. 
 
   2.  The proxy signcrypter group verifies the correctness of  each aiS  by the equation 
             
                                      ))(,(),( 2 waiai mHyeSPe =       
3.  If each aiS  is verified, then each proxy signcrypter Pj computes å
=
=
n
i
aiA SS
1
and 
        his proxy signcryption key   )(2 WpjApj mHxSS += . 
 
Multi-Proxy Multi-Signcryption Generation: One proxy signcrypter say P1, may be 
designated as a clerk, whose task is to combine partial proxy signcryption to generate the 
final multi-proxy multi-signcryption. 
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1. Each Pj selects an integer *qRj Zt Î , and computes  
jt
cpj yPer ),(= and  
2. Pj broadcasts pjr  to other proxy signcrypters, P1, P2,…. , Pj-1, Pj+1 ,…., Pl . 
3.  Each Pj computes     )(
1
3 Õ
=
=
l
j
pjrHk ,   )(mEc k= , )||(1 kcHr p =  
     and  pjpjpj SrPtu -=  , and sends pju  to the clerk P1 as his partial proxy   
     signcryption on m,  
4.  P1 computes å
=
=
l
j
pjp uu
1
, AlSS =  and sends ( Wm , S, c, rp, up ) to the b    
     unsigncrypter C as multi-proxy multi-signcryption of m. 
 
 
Unsigncryption: After ( Wm , S, c, rp, up ), C computes  
                     
                           ))),((),(),((
1
23
cpp xr
l
j
pjW
r
ccp ymHeySeyueHk å
=
=  
                     
and accepts the multi-proxy multi- signcryption if and only if   )||(1 kcHr p = . 
She then recovers )(cDm k= . 
 
 
4    Our proposed scheme 
                                                       
To make the proposed scheme identity based, we introduce the Private Key Generator 
(PKG) along with original signcrypter group {A1, A2…. An}, proxy signcerypter group  
{ P1, P2,…., Pl }and the unsigncrypter C.  
 
Set up:  Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses group G1 and G2 of prime order 
q, a generator P of G1, a bilinear map  211: GGGe ®´  and hash functions 
1
*
1 }1,0{: GH ® , 
nGH }1,0{: 22 ®  and  
*
2
*
3 }1,0{: qZGH ®´ . 
Then PKG chooses a secret key *qR ZsÎ  and computes sPPPub = . It also chooses a 
secure symmetric cryptosystem (E, D).  
The system’s public parameters are P = (G1, G2, n, e, P, PPub, H1, H2, H3, E, D). 
 
 
Key generation:  Given an  identity ID, the PKG computes user’s public key 
)(1 IDHQID =  and secret key  IDID sQS = .  
Each signcrypters Ai has a public key  )(1 AiID IDHQ Ai =  and secret key   AiAi IDID sQS = . 
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Similarly each proxy signcrypter P j has a public key )(1 pjID IDHQ p j =  and secret key   
p jp j IDID
sQS = . Unsigncrypter; C has a public key  )(1 cID IDHQ c =  and a secret key     
cc IDID
sQS = . 
 
 
Proxy Keygenration:  To delegate the signcrypting capability to a group of proxy 
signcrypters,the original signcrypters make the signed warrant Wm . Which may include 
an explicit description of the delegation relation including the identity of the original 
signcrypters and the proxy signcrypters, the message to be signed, and so on. Then 
broadcasts Wm  to the l proxy signcrypters. 
       
Each proxy signcrypter Pj recover the proxy key pjS in the following manner: 
 
1. Each Ai computes  )(1 WIDAi mHSS Ai=  and broadcasts AiS  to the each proxy 
signcrypter. 
2. The proxy signcrypter group verifies the correctness of each  AiS  by the equation 
                  
                ))(,(),( 1 WIDPubAi mHQPeSPe Ai=              i = 1, 2…….n 
3. If all the above equation holds, the proxy signcrypter group  computes å
=
=
n
i
AiA SS
1
. 
         Each proxy signcrypter Pj computes his proxy signcryption key pjS  as    
               )(1 WIDApj mHSSS p j+=    
 
 
Multi-Proxy Multi-Signcryption Generation:  Here we assume that one member of the 
proxy signcrypter say P1, is the clerk who combines all partial proxy signcryptions. 
. 
  
1. Each Pj selects *qRj Zt Î , and computes 
                21 ),( GPPek
jt
Pubj Î=  and  22 ),( GQPek
j
c
t
IDPubj Î=  
 
   2.   Pj  broadcasts k1j  and  k2j to the remaining proxy signcrypters. 
 
   3.   Each Pj now computes   2
1
11 Gkk
l
j
j Î= Õ
=
 and  
         2
1
222 )( GkHk
l
j
j Î= Õ
=
,   )(
2
mEc k= ,   ),( 13 kcHr p = ,  1GSrPtu pjpPubjpj Î-= , 
         and sends pju  to the clerk P1 as his partial proxy signcryption on m. 
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    4.   The clerk computes å
=
=
l
j
pjp uu
1
,   AlSS =  and sends ( Wm , S, c, pr , pu ) to C  
          multi-proxy multi-signcryption of m. 
 
 
Unsigncryption:  After receiving ( Wm , S, c, pr , pu ), C computes          
                         Pubp
p j
p Pr
l
j
IDW
r
p QmHePSePuek )),((),(),(
1
11 å
=
=  and  
                        ))),((),(),((
1
122 å
=
=
l
j
Sr
IDW
r
IDIDp
IDcp
pj
p
cc
QmHeQSeQueHk  
 
accept the proxy signature if and only if  ),( 13 kcHr p = .  
Satisfied, she may recover the message as )(
2
cDm k= . 
 
5    Security Analysis 
 
Verifiability:   
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 Strong Unforgeability:  As for multi-proxy multi-signcryption, there are mainly four 
kinds of attackers: any third party, who do not participate the issue of the multi-proxy 
multi-signcryption; some proxy signcrypter, who plays an active part in signcryption 
process; the original signcrypter and the signcryption owner. Because the multi-proxy 
multi signcryption   å
=
=
l
j
pjp uu
1
 contains secret key information  
p jID
S  of each proxy 
signcrypter Pj    in the proxy multi-signcryption key generation phase, without secret key 
information   
p jID
S  of  Pj , any third party, some proxy signcrypter, the signcryption 
owner and the original signcrypters cannot generate a valid multi-proxy multi-
signcryption scheme by themselves. 
 
Strong Identifiably:  The unsigncrypter can distinguish proxy’s normal signcryption from 
his multi-proxy multi- signcryption, because the multi-proxy multi-signcryption key is 
different from his own private key. 
 
Strong Nonrepudiation:  In our scheme, each proxy signcrypter Pj   cannot repudiate his 
participation on multi-proxy multi-signcryption while illegal attacker cannot claim that he 
is proxy signcrypter, because   å
=
=
l
j
pjp uu
1
 contains secret key information   
p jID
S of each 
proxy signcrypter Pj , at the same time, warrant Wm  also contains identity information of  
Pj , in addition   ))),((),(),((
1
122 å
=
=
l
j
Sr
IDW
r
IDIDp
IDcp
pj
p
cc
QmHeQSeQueHk  contains 
p jID
Q  
and  Wm . 
 
Confidentiality:  Because the secret key 2k  contains secret key information cIDS of C, 
only C can compute 2k and recover m. 
 
Prevention of Misuses:  No proxy signcrypter Pj  can repudiate his participation on multi-
proxy multi- signcryption. In addition,  Wm  includes the message to be signed, so our 
scheme can prevent the misuse. 
 
Public verifiability:  Any third party can verify the multisignature, so our scheme 
provides the public verifiability. 
 
 
6    Conclusions 
 
In this paper, based on Liu Jun Bao and Xiao Guo-Zhen scheme [9] we construct a new 
ID-based multi-proxy multi-signcryption scheme from pairing. As compared to Liu Jun 
Bao and Xiao Guo-Zhen scheme the proposed scheme provide the public verifiability of 
the proxy signature. Further the scheme is ID-based therefore; the key management 
problem is simplified. 
 8 
References  
 
  [1]  S.J. Hwang, C.H. Shi, “A simple Multi-Proxy Signature Scheme,” Proceeding of the  
        Tenth National Conference on Information Security, Taiwan, 2000, pp. 134-138. 
   
  [2]  S.J. Hwang, C.C. Chen, “A New Multi-Proxy Multi-Signature Scheme,” 2001   
        National Computer Symposium: Information Security, Taipei, Taiwan, 2001, pp.   
        F019-F026. 
   
  [3]  J.G. Li, Z.F. Cao, Y.C. Zhang, “Improvement of M-U-O and K-P-W proxy  
        signature schemes,” Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, pp. 145-148,   
        Feb.2002. 
 
   
  [4]  J.G. Li, Z.F. Cao, Y.C. Zhang, “Nonrepudiable proxy multi-signature schemes,”  
        Journal of Computer Science and Technology, Vol. 18, pp. 399-402, Mar.2003. 
 
  [5]  J.G. Li, Z.F. Cao, “Improvement of a Threshold proxy signature scheme,”  
        Improvement of Computer Research and Development, Vol. 39, pp. 515-518,  
        Nov.2002.  
 
  [6]  X.X. Li and K.H. Chen, “Multi-proxy Signature and Proxy Multi-signature Scheme  
         from bilinear pairing,” LNCS #3320, Springer-Verlag, Singapore, pp. 591-595,   
         Dec.2004. 
 
  [7]  X.X. Li and K.H. Chen, “Identity Based Proxy-Signcryption Scheme from  
         Pairings,” Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE International Conference on Services   
         Computing (SCC’04), pp. 494-497, Sept.2004.  
 
  [8]  B. Libert and J. Quisquater, “A new Identity Based Signcryption Scheme from  
         Pairings,” in 2003 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, pp. 155-158, Paris, France,  
         2003.  
 
  [9]  Jun-Bao Liu and Guo-Zhen Xiao, “Multi-Proxy Multi-Signcryption Scheme from   
        Pairings,” in 2005 ava ilable at arxiv.org/abs/cs.CR/0509030. 
 
  [10]  J. Malone-Lee, “Identity based Signcryption,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report  
          2002/098, 2002. Available from: http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/098.  
 
  [11]  J. Malone-Lee and W. Mao, “Two birds one stone: Signcryption using RSA,” in  
          Topics in Cryptology-CT-RSA 2003, LNCS #2612, pp. 211-225, Springer-Verlag,  
          2003.  
 
  [12]  M. Mambo, K. Usuda and E. Okamoto, “Proxy signature: delegation of the power  
           to sign messages,” IEICE Trans. Fundamentals, E79-A:9, 1996, pp. 1338-1353.  
 
 9 
  [13]  A. Shamir, “How to share a secret,”  Communications of the ACM, vol. 24, no.11,  
           pp. 612-613, 1979. 
 
  [14]  R. Steinfeld and Y. Zheng, “A Signcryption Scheme based on Integer  
           factorization,” in The Third Information Security Workshop (ISW 2000), LNCS  
           #1975, pp. 308-322, Springer-Verlag, 2000. 
 
  [15]  Q.S. Xue, Z.F. Cao, “A Nonrepudiable Multi-proxy Multi-signature Scheme,” in  
           Mobile Future, 2004 and the Symposium on Trends in Communications.Sympo   
           TIC’04, pp. 102-105. Oct. 2004. 
 
  [16]  Y. Zheng, “Digital signcryption or how to achieve cost (signature & encryption)  
           < cost (signature) + cost (encryption),” in CRYPTO’97, LNCS #1924, Springer- 
           Verlag, pp. 165-179, 1997.  
 
   
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
